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SUMMARY: This article presents for the first time an examination of the Special Operations Executive’s 
(SOE) UK-based communication facilities. Established in 1940, SOE was responsible for coordinating 
all acts of sabotage against the enemy overseas. This was only possible with the aid of a reliable 
communications link with the Resistance. By examining SOE’s Home Stations, this article will 
demonstrate the value the organization placed in reliable wireless communications. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In July 1940, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) 
was formed with a remit to 
organize movements in enemy-occupied coun- 
tries comparable to the Sinn Fein movement   
in Ireland, to the Chinese Guerrillas operating 
against Japan, to the Spanish Irregulars who 
played a notable part in Wellington’s cam- 
paign or — one might as well admit it — to the 
organizations which the Nazis themselves have 
developed.1 
Although SOE only existed operationally for 71 months, 
at its maximum size it employed 10,000 men and 3,200 
women.2 Throughout the Second World War, the organ- 
ization was involved in a wide variety of activities 
intended to support and stimulate resistance behind 
enemy lines. These included assassinations, sabotage, 
blackmail, organizing escape routes, training and arm- 
ing partisans and gathering intelligence. In order to 
operate effectively, it was essential that the European 
Resistance had access to a modern communications net- 
work back to SOE in the UK. This link was essential for 
arranging the delivery of supplies to the organization’s 
 
representatives operating within occupied Europe. 
Communications were also vital for reporting enemy 
activities, arranging for the extraction of personnel, 
coordinating operations and organizing missions.3 
Without this direct link, SOE’s agents and the wider 
resistance would have been isolated in hostile territory.4 
In order to communicate with the European 
Resistance, it was essential that trained radio oper- 
ators were embedded within their networks. These 
agents would have been provided with wireless sets by 
SOE.5 They would then communicate back to ‘Home 
Stations’6 established by the organization in the UK. 
Although SOE did not gain control of their own wire- 
less networks until 1942, by the end of the war they 
had invested heavily in developing modern communi- 
cation facilities. Despite the essential nature of SOE’s 
UK-based wireless facilities to the organization, no 
study exists which covers the physical infrastructure 
of their Home Stations.7 As the infrastructure of the 
Secret Services is less ‘glamorous’ than their opera- 
tions, this area of research is, relatively speaking, not 
well understood.8 The aim of this article is therefore 
to address this gap in our knowledge. 
Of the various aspects of SOE’s UK-based sup- 
port infrastructure, their communications facilities 
 
 have left the greatest archaeological trace. Accordingly, 
this article will also briefly present the findings of a 
survey undertaken at SOE’s Station 53B transmitter at 
Godington, Oxfordshire.9 Over the operational life of 
the organization, SOE was to become one of the most 
controversial branches of the British Secret Services.10 
One of their greatest and most vocal critics was the 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), more commonly 
known as MI6. Until 1942, however, SIS was solely 
responsible for operating SOE’s wireless communica- 
tions with their representatives abroad. One of the goals 
of this article is to present an assessment of the value 
the two organizations placed in their wireless commu- 
nications. In order to accomplish this, the article begins 
by presenting a history of SOE’s wireless communi- 
cations. This will then be followed by a discussion of 
the nature of the organization’s Home Stations. As it 
was SIS’s responsibility to communicate on behalf of 
SOE until 1942, the nature of their wireless facilities 
will also be examined. In order to assess the quality of 
the organization’s wireless infrastructure, it is essential 
that a comparison is made with other contemporary 
communication facilities. Based on this discussion, 
the article will conclude with a holistic assessment of 
SOE’s Home Stations during the Second World War. 
 
 
THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOE AND SIS 
WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 
 
Despite the high importance  the  organization  was 
to attach to wireless communications, SOE was not 
initially in charge of its own networks. In September 
1940, two months after the organization had been 
formed, an agreement was reached between SOE and 
SIS.11 This accord ensured that all traffic which origi- 
nated from within SOE was handled by SIS. It was also 
agreed that the head of SIS (known as ‘C’) had the right 
to reject any message which he deemed compromising 
to his organization’s security.12 Understandably, this 
situation was far from ideal from SOE’s standpoint. 
Despite being the elder service, SIS had no claim to 
being experts in the field of clandestine communica- 
tions. At the time SOE and SIS signed their communi- 
cations agreement, the latter had only recently started 
working with wireless technology. 
 
 
COMMUNICATING WITH THE RESISTANCE 
 
The origins of SIS’s own network lie in the period 
immediately before the First World War. The Royal 
Navy first installed radio equipment into HMS Juro and 
HMS Europa in 1899,13 but it was not until the spring 
of 1912 that Commander Mansfield Cummings, the 
first head of SIS, began contemplating using the tech- 
nology.14 Cummings saw radios as a potential method 
of obtaining intelligence during periods of political 
tension. It was not for another 26 years, however, that 
SIS would finally establish a formal communications 
group. Command of the new Section VIII was offered 
to Captain Richard Gambier-Parry.15 As commercial 
technology had proved unsuitable for his requirements, 
one of the first and ultimately most difficult challenges 
Gambier-Parry faced was providing SIS’s agents with 
wireless sets.16 At the time SOE and SIS reached their 
agreement on wireless communications the latter 
could, therefore, only call on two years’ experience. 
By having to rely on a third party to control their 
communications, SOE was at the mercy of a compet- 
ing branch of the Secret Services. By March 1942, the 
organization had already begun noticing issues with 
their traffic. Though they were marked as being of the 
highest priority, SIS was not handling SOE’s messages 
in an appropriate manner. Following an internal inves- 
tigation, SOE determined that SIS took four days to 
deliver a telegram from their organization’s Balkans or 
Middle East missions back to the UK. Of greater con- 
cern to the secretive SOE than the delay in receiving 
messages was the ability of C to impose an ‘inquisitive 
censorship over the whole of our [SOE’s] activities’.17 
By not controlling their own wireless networks, SOE 
also faced the challenge that SIS maintained the 
ability to limit the number of agents the organization 
sent abroad. SIS was of the opinion that they held the 
authority to restrict SOE’s agents to ‘the capacity of the 
receiving scheme … [and] by the fact that to increase 
the number to any extent will constitute a menace to 
security’.18 By April 1941, SOE had between 300 and 
400 students undergoing instruction in their Special 
Training Schools (STSs). This number of agents, how- 
ever, was too great for the ‘necessary arrangements 
made by S.I.S. for the reception of their messages as 
and when they arrive in the countries where it is pro- 
posed that they should operate’.19 In order to achieve 
the role allocated to SOE, it was essential that the 
organization could operate a greater number of agents 
within occupied Europe. The running of the organ- 
ization’s wireless communications by a competing 
branch of the Secret Services was far from ideal. It 
was, therefore, essential to SOE that a new agreement 
with SIS be reached. 
Following prolonged discussions, SIS finally 
agreed in February 1942 to transfer operational control 
of SOE’s wireless traffic to the organization. Despite 
this new agreement, there remained the caveat that 
SOE had to ensure that all necessary ‘security require- 
ments were met’.20 SOE also agreed that C retained the 
right to reduce any of their channels if it was 
found that interference or embarrassment to SIS 
communications resulted … One more condition 
 … is that it must be clearly understood that SOE 
will not, under any circumstances, undertake any 
communications for the representatives of any 
Allied Power without reference to me.21 
On 27 March, SOE agreed to C’s conditions.22 It was 
not until 1 June 1942, however, that the organization’s 
wireless networks officially separated from SIS.23 SOE 
was now in a position, free from SIS, to develop a 
highly professional, modern system of wireless com- 
munications with their agents operating within ene- 
my-occupied Europe. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOE’S WIRELESS 
FACILITIES 
 
Once SOE gained control of their own wireless net- 
works, the organization could begin establishing 
independent facilities. By the end of the war, the organ- 
ization was communicating with occupied Europe from 
two Home Stations, whilst a third was operated on their 
behalf by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).24 All 
these facilities were to be located between Bicester in 
Oxfordshire and Bletchley Park in Buckinghamshire 
(Fig. 1). 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 1 
The distribution of SOE’s wireless Home Stations following the transfer of control of their communication networks from 
SIS to the organization (© Crown Copyright and Database Right 2015. Ordnance Survey Digimap Licence). 
 Within four months of the new agreement between 
SOE and SIS, the former had already established 
their first Home Station. The receiving component  
of this facility was operated by the organization from 
Grendon Underwood, Buckinghamshire, and named 
Station 53A,25 while the transmitter was at Charndon, 
Buckinghamshire.26 SOE’s establishment of a com- 
munications facility at Grendon Underwood did not, 
however, go unchallenged by SIS. Despite protracted 
discussions which clearly identified this property as 
their preferred choice, in April 1942 Gambier-Parry 
began protesting that he had only just been informed 
of this decision.27 His concerns centred on the fact that 
Grendon Underwood was only ten miles from one of 
his most important receiving stations and he felt that 
there was a strong possibility that interference would 
result as both organizations worked within the same 
frequency band.28 As a consequence of his concerns, 
Gambier-Parry informed SOE that he hoped they had 
not involved themselves ‘in a lot of constructional 
work until the possibilities of interference have been 
thoroughly explored’.29 Despite  his  apprehensions, 
it was Gambier-Parry who had suggested that SOE 
establish their new receiving station at Grendon 
Underwood.30 
By 13 April 1942, Gambier-Parry was of the 
opinion that 
it would be much better if we went into the mat- 
ter now between our two selves and settled any 
possible causes of future disagreement before 
they arise, rather than wait until we have to take 
them formally to the W/T [Wireless Telegraphy] 
Board, should your detailed proposals be of a 
nature likely to cause embarrassment to existing 
services.31 
Eventually, SIS conceded and SOE established their 
first receiver at what had been STS53. This formed the 
first building block in the organization’s capabilities to 
independently handle their wireless communications. 
 
 
THE NATURE OF SOE’S COMMUNICATION 
FACILITIES 
 
The first attempt by SOE to establish wireless commu- 
nications with occupied Europe was of a basic nature. 
Once SIS dropped their objections to the establishment 
of a receiver at Grendon Underwood, SOE constructed 
their first Signal Office in a downstairs room in the 
main house. As the transmitters and receivers had to 
be located in different areas, the organization estab- 
lished Grendon Underwood’s partner facility nearby 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 2 
SOE’s first transmitter at Charndon in 2013. The structure to the left was the first transmitter building; the extension to 
the right was a later addition. Structural analysis indicates that there was at least three phases of construction (photo, D. 
Gregory). 
 at Charndon. Here, SOE constructed a building meas- 
uring 20ft (6.1m) by 12ft (3.66m) to house their trans- 
mitters (Fig. 2). This structure was connected to the 
receiver by a 20-pair cable. Inside, the organization 
installed equipment which enabled them to operate the 
18 250w transmitters by remote control. The limited 
capacity of this complex was, however, rapidly out- 
stripped by SOE’s increasing traffic volume. It was, 
therefore, inevitable that the organization experienced 
a considerable loss of efficiency and flexibility in their 
wireless communications.32 
In an effort to alleviate the overcrowding SOE 
experienced at Grendon Underwood, a decision was 
taken to construct a new Signal Office within the estate. 
This structure rapidly proved a considerable improve- 
ment over the ad hoc facilities in the main house. Inside 
the Signal Office, SOE installed eighteen operating 
positions.33 The organization also ensured that the new 
superintendent’s desk had the capability of connecting 
any position to any transmitter. This desk was also 
provided with the ability to monitor communications 
over all the receivers. In parallel to this building pro- 
gramme, SOE also expanded their transmitter complex 
at Charndon by adding an extension measuring 35ft 
(10.67m) by 18ft (5.49m) to the existing building. SOE 
installed a further six 250w transmitters in the latter.34 
Despite this expansion in capacity, the building 
programmes only provided SOE with a temporary 
respite. It was not long before the organization’s 
demands once more outstripped their wireless capa- 
bilities. Eventually, SOE decided the solution to their 
problems was to build a dedicated facility. Within six 
months of gaining operational control of their wireless 
networks from SIS, SOE began constructing their first 
purpose-built Home Station.35 The location chosen for 
the new receiver was Poundon, Oxfordshire, and the 
transmitter was erected at Godington, Oxfordshire.36 
In order to meet the increasing demands on their 
wireless facilities, SOE’s new receiving station at 
Poundon was designed to be sustainably larger than the 
organization’s facility at Grendon Underwood. Within 
the organization, this Home Station was to become 
known as Station 53B. The facility’s receivers were 
installed in a purpose-built structure measuring 40ft 
(12.19m) by 40ft (12.19m) by 12ft (3.66m) (Fig. 3). 
Into this building, SOE installed 40 operating posi- 
tions, of which over half were adapted for automatic 
sending. In an effort to economize on antennae, the 
organization also installed new Wide Band Receiving 
Amplifiers within their structure at Poundon. This gave 
SOE the ability to operate as many as 50 receivers 
simultaneously from each amplifier.37 
The  transmitter complex for  SOE’s  new Home 
Station was erected nearby at Godington (Fig. 4).38 
The organization’s internalized building section incor- 
porated contemporary design standards for wireless 
stations  during  the  latter’s  facility’s construction.39 
To limit the impact of the generators on the delicate 
wireless equipment, a separate structure was erected 
besides the Transmitter Building. The structure which 
held the transmitters measured 100ft (30.48m) by 
24ft (7.32m) and incorporated features which allowed 
open wire feeder routes (Fig. 5). Constructed from red 
bricks laid in English bond, this building differs from 
the Sussex bond brickwork of the Generator Building. 
Internally, the Transmitter Building is arranged into 
four rooms in which various fixtures and fittings sur- 
vive. The floors in these rooms is poured concrete   
of a finer grade than that of the Generator Building. 
Originally, the entrances were located on the eastern 
elevation and on the western edge of the northern 
elevation. At a later date, two further later entrances 
were formed by demolishing sections of the northern 
elevation onto which an lean-to was erected following 
decommissioning. The posts which formed this exten- 
sion were originally telegraph poles which probably 
formed the antennae of Station 53B. Along both the 
northern and southern elevations are fifteen narrow 
windows located just beneath the roof line. 
Within the Transmitter Building (Fig. 8), the 
equipment was placed within Room 4 and Room 5.40 
This space was designed so that the transmitters could 
be arranged along both walls which ran the length of 
the building.41 Originally, this room was 3.6m tall, 
7.32m wide and 30.2m long. This created a light and 
airy space in which the transmitters could be operated. 
By constructing this large room, SOE also provided 
their engineers with sufficient space to inspect, repair 
and replace their equipment easily and efficiently. Into 
this room, SOE housed 34 250w transmitters together 
with their remote-control apparatus. In order to connect 
up all this equipment, the organization had to acquire 
over 6,000ft (1,828.8m) of lead-covered wire.42 Direct 
access to the outside was via a doorway built into the 
eastern elevation of this room. Through this, equipment 
could be easily moved in and out of the structure. 
To the west of the transmitter room, a doorway 
led into the complex’s office. Along the southern ele- 
vation of this space, a slit cut into the wall allowed 
staff to observe the antennae which were erected in the 
fields around the structure. The main entrance to the 
Transmitter Building was through a cloakroom leading 
off the office. 
In comparison, the Generator Building sat atop 
two courses of engineering bricks (Fig. 6), and is 
arranged into seven distinct areas (Fig. 7). Entrance to 
the main structure is via a door located on the eastern 
edge of the northern elevation. Two smaller rooms, 
which are accessed separately, are located in the west- 
ern end of the structure. The lack of external windows 
in these spaces, combined with their confined area, 
indicates that these were probably intended for storage. 
Entrance to the main structure is via an open 
doorway on the eastern end of the northern elevation. 
  
 
 
FIG. 3 
The receiver of SOE’s first purpose-built Home Station, Station 53b, was located in Poundon, Oxfordshire. Nearby, Station 
53c was constructed by SOE on behalf of the OSS (© Crown Copyright and Landmark Information Group Limited 2015. All 
rights reserved). 
 
On entering the structure, the entrance ‘hallway’ was 
originally split into two distinct areas by a waist-high 
swing door.43 This arrangement suggests that these 
spaces were used as a cloakroom or changing facility 
for staff entering the generator room.44 Beyond this 
‘hallway’ was located the room which housed the gen- 
erator. Within the poured concrete floor of Room 5 
is a rectangular mark, 1.07m wide and 3.29m long. 
Set within this are two rows of five metal bolts which 
project 0.02m from the concrete floor. Onto these, 
SOE would have bolted the generator. This ensured 
vibrations caused by the generator could not damage 
the equipment. 
Passing through the generator  room,  there  is 
an enclosed space which has no external windows   
or doors. There are also no obvious signs that there 
were originally internal fixtures or fittings. The  
room was, therefore, probably used to store items. 
Surviving on the western elevation of this room are  
a series of pencil inscriptions. Although degraded, it 
  
 
 
FIG. 4 
Architectural survey of Station 53B transmitter, Godington (drawing, D. Gregory). 
 
is possible to identify ‘For men may come and men 
may go’ and ‘Roll of Honour’.45 Beneath this is a col- 
lection of pencil graffiti which includes ‘BENJAMIN 
DECEASED JAN – 45’, ‘J. DREWERY JUNE 1945’ 
and ‘ASSISTANT INSPECTOR BILL HORSEY RAF 
JULY 1945’.46 These dates are consistent with the 
occupation of the building by SOE. Whom they refer 
to is currently less easy to ascertain. As Godington was 
operated by remote control by staff based at Poundon, 
it was only necessary for the engineers who looked 
after the equipment to be stationed at the transmitter. 
This facility would therefore not be in direct contact 
with agents in the field. Even if the staff were aware 
of agents operating within occupied Europe, knowl- 
edge of their real names would constitute a security 
lapse. These names therefore potentially record people 
known to SOE’s staff based at Godington who were 
killed during the war. As the graffiti is located within 
Room 6 of the Generator Building, this suggests that 
there was a high footfall of staff using this space. 
Further   storage   space   within   the Generator 
Building was provided by the construction of Room 
7. this extension was probably added to the structure 
at the time the Transmitter Building was erected. As 
there was no overhead cover, the items held here 
were presumably neither perishable nor delicate. 
During the construction of the Generator Building, 
SOE’s builders ensured that there was sufficient 
space for storing essential equipment and supplies. 
This structure was also designed specially to limit 
the impact of the vibrations produced by the gen- 
erator. Combined, the two buildings which formed 
SOE’s Station 53B were well designed, modern and 
ideally suited to their specific requirements. In order 
to damp-proof the building, a layer of slate was set 
within the brickwork. 
Disparities in construction between the Generator 
and Transmitter Buildings suggests that they were 
erected at different times. This is further illustrated by 
the fact that the construction style of the Transmitter 
Building is similar to Room 7 of the Generator 
Building. Room 7 is not keyed into the main struc- 
ture which housed the generator, suggesting that there 
were two phases of construction at SOE’s transmitter 
complex at Godington: initially the Generator Building 
was erected, followed by the Room 7 extension and the 
Transmitter Building.47 
Following the construction of Station 53B, SOE 
once more discovered that their flow of wireless traf- 
fic still outstripped their capacity to handle messages. 
As a consequence, the organization decided to install 
Wide Band Receiving Amplifiers at Stations 53A’s 
transmitter at Charndon.48 Instead of upgrading their 
existing facility, the decision was taken to construct a 
new building based on the design of Godington.49 This 
structure allowed SOE to centralize their equipment 
into a single building, whilst also providing sufficient 
space for the number of transmitters to be increased. 
By constructing another facility, SOE could also install 
a new ‘trouble-free’ remote control system. In order to 
  
 
 
FIG. 5 
The southern elevation of the Transmitter Building at SOE’s Station 53B in 2013 (photo, D. Gregory). 
 
operate this, the organization required over 3,000m of 
twin lead-covered wire.50 Messages were then trans- 
mitted over the 35 dipoles and two rhombic anten- 
nae which were constructed nearby.51 To connect all 
these antennae, the feeder route required an additional 
100,000ft (30,480m) of copper wiring.52 
In constructing their Home Stations, SOE invested 
significant resources in an effort to establish reliable 
and efficient communications. This clearly illustrates 
the value the organization placed on being able to con- 
tact their representatives abroad. Despite this, on the 
formation of SOE the organization’s wireless networks 
were not under their direct control. Following an agree- 
ment between SIS and SOE to transfer operational 
control of the latter’s communications, SOE rapidly 
began developing ad hoc facilities. Within six months, 
however, operational requirements necessitated that the 
organization had to construct a purpose-built Home 
Station. This initiated a programme of work upgrad- 
ing their existing facilities, combined with construct- 
ing new Home Stations. In order to comprehensively 
assess the nature of SOE’s wireless stations, it is 
essential that a comparison is made with contempo- 
rary facilities. By undertaking this assessment, SOE’s 
appreciation of the value of wireless communications 
can be demonstrated. 
 
 
COMPARISON BETWEEN SOE’S HOME 
STATIONS AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY 
WIRELESS FACILITIES 
 
The construction of SOE’s Home Stations did not 
occur in isolation: there were other contemporary 
organizations which were also involved in wireless 
telegraphy. It is, therefore, of value to compare SOE’s 
Home Stations with those of their peers. As will be 
demonstrated, despite internalizing their building capa- 
bilities in 1942,53 the architectural and technological 
nature of SOE’s Home Stations were in keeping with 
contemporary design standards. 
At the time SOE was formed, the greatest exper- 
tise in wireless broadcasting within the UK lay with the 
  
 
 
FIG. 6 
The northern elevation of the Generator Building at SOE’s Station 53B transmitter, Godington, in 2013 (photo, D. Gregory). 
 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Twenty years 
prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the 
BBC had identified that the majority of ‘shut downs’ in 
their broadcasting service had been caused by failings 
in the National Grid. In an effort to overcome this issue, 
the corporation established a regional network of twin 
wireless transmitting stations. Each of these facilities 
was provided with a self-contained generating plant. In 
constructing these units, the BBC could offer a more 
reliable service combined with the ability to fluctuate 
voltage.54 
Once the BBC had taken the decision to provide 
independent power to broadcasting facilities, the cor- 
poration had to address issues relating to the impact 
of the generators on the quality of transmissions. If 
careful consideration was not taken in positioning the 
equipment, noise and vibrations from the generators 
could have a serious negative impact on the delicate 
wireless sets. It was also essential for the comfort of 
the technicians operating the equipment that silence 
prevailed in the room holding the transmitters. This had 
the added benefit of making it easier for staff to locate 
faults caused by arcing and sparking.55 
In an effort to minimize the impact of the gener- 
ator on the delicate wireless equipment, a variety of 
techniques could be employed. At the General Post 
Office (GPO) short-wave receiving station constructed 
in the 1930s on the Hoo Peninsular, Kent, the generator 
was located in a room which, although connected to 
the main structure, was isolated from the rest of the 
building.56 Not only did this limit the impact of the 
vibrations, but it also ensured that dust and noise pro- 
duced by the generator did not affect staff and equip- 
ment in the main building. It was not, however, always 
possible to physically segregate the generator from the 
rest of the building. In these situations, it was essential 
that the engineers could find alternative methods of 
limiting the negative impact of the generator. Staff at 
the WRC broadcasting station, which occupied a pre- 
existing office building on 14th Street and Park Road, 
Washington D.C., USA, mounted their generator on a 
steel bed atop a 0.08m cork mat.57 This was designed 
  
 
 
FIG. 7 
Floor plan of the Generator Building (drawing, D. Gregory). 
 
 
 
FIG. 8 
Floor plan of the Transmitter Building (drawing, D. Gregory). 
 to act as a cushion, absorbing vibrations produced by 
the generator. 
It is clear that, during the construction of SOE’s 
transmitter complex at Godington, the organization’s 
builders adhered to contemporary design standards 
for wireless facilities.58 Not only was the generator 
installed in a building separated from the wireless 
equipment, it was also bolted to a concrete bed inset 
within the floor. By isolating the generator and bolting 
it to the ground, SOE shielded their delicate transmit- 
ting equipment from vibrations and dust. The isola- 
tion of the generator was not the only contemporary 
design standard adhered to by SOE during the con- 
struction of their transmitter building at Godington. 
At the 50kw frequency-modulation transmitter in the 
Helderberg Mountains, New York, USA, the station 
was designed to allow staff the maximum accessibility 
to components for inspection and maintenance.59 In 
contrast, at facilities operated by the BBC, this was 
accomplished by placing the wireless equipment along 
walls either side of the structure. By keeping the rest 
of the space free from clutter, staff could easily main- 
tain the equipment.60 At Godington, the same design 
standards were incorporated into the room which held 
the transmitters; the equipment was arranged along the 
two external walls within a large, airy room. Despite 
SOE internalizing the construction process by forming 
an internal building section during 1942,61 the organ- 
ization demonstrated a high level of knowledge and 
competence of contemporary design standards. 
As has been discussed, until June 1942 it had 
been SIS’s responsibility to communicate with SOE’s 
representatives abroad. Comparing the two organiza- 
tion’s facilities is therefore instructive. From the out- 
break of the Second World War, SIS’s communications 
were the responsibility of Section VII.62 Initially, this 
section operated from rooms within Bletchley Park, 
Buckinghamshire.63 The limited space available and 
the ad hoc arrangement meant this facility rapidly 
proved insufficient for SIS’s needs. Before the close 
of 1939, SIS’s Section VIII was already in the process 
of relocating to Whaddon Hall, Buckinghamshire.64 
Whaddon Hall was to become SIS’s new ‘Main 
Line’ station. At this facility, Section VIII handled the 
organization’s traffic which originated from within 
embassies and overseas missions, as well  as  cov- 
ert stations on the Continent, and they occasionally 
communicated directly with agents. As the war pro- 
gressed, further wireless facilities were established by 
SIS at Dower House, Buckinghamshire, Windy Ridge, 
Buckinghamshire, Tattenhoe Barn, Buckinghamshire 
and Creslow Manor, Buckinghamshire.65 It took SIS 
until early 1940, however, before they began con- 
structing their first purpose-built wireless facility for 
handling agents’ traffic alone. By the end of the year, 
construction had finished at SIS’s new receiving sta- 
tion at Nash, Buckinghamshire. The transmitter for 
this complex was located at Manor Farm, Calverton, 
Buckinghamshire. Later in the war, a further receiv- 
ing station was constructed by SIS at Upper Weald, 
Buckinghamshire. This new facility also worked with 
the transmitters located at Manor Farm.66 
At SIS’s receiving facility located at Nash, the 
organization constructed a shed to house their equip- 
ment, and a brick-built generator building with an 
attached battery store. Nash’s  sister station located  
at Upper Weald was slightly larger; here, two sheds 
were provided alongside the brick-built generator 
and battery store.67 These structures were cramped 
and basic in comparison to SOE’s spacious, profes- 
sional and well thought-out wireless facilities.68 In 
order to operate their receiving facility at Nash, SIS 
employed nine men on a three-watch system. One of 
these operators, Jack White, recalled that the organi- 
zation installed eight receivers at Nash; seven HROs, 
manufactured by the National Radio Company, and his 
personal battery-operated AR88. Whilst at SIS’s com- 
plex at Manor Farm, the transmitters comprised various 
American 750w and British 100w and 30w sets. Due 
to the quantity of American equipment operated from 
this facility, SIS accommodated four engineers from 
the US Civilian Technical Corps at Manor Farm to 
maintain the transmitters.69 Although the nature of the 
antennae at SIS’s facilities is unknown, it is known 
that, at Upper Weald, messages from the field were 
received over semi-vertical wires suspended from rel- 
atively low cantilever wires. It was not until 1944 that 
this system was improved, when SIS arranged for a 
crew of aerial erectors to visit the facility.70 Overall, 
the facilities operated by SIS were under-resourced and 
undervalued. Even amongst SIS’s Section VIII radio 
operators there existed a feeling that the organization 
viewed communicating with their agents as a lower 
priority than intercepting enemy transmissions.71 In 
contrast to the ad hoc facilities operated by SIS, SOE 
rapidly developed a network of modern wireless sta- 
tions. This reflected the value the organization placed 
on communicating with their representatives abroad. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
With the development of wireless technology at the 
end of the 19th century, a new dimension was brought 
to the battlefield. By having access to instantaneous, 
long-distance communications, the military could act 
on intelligence which had been relayed in real-time. 
Through assessing SOE’s Home Stations, it is clear 
that the organization appreciated the value of wireless 
communications to clandestine operations. By ensur- 
ing they had a direct link with their representatives 
abroad, SOE had the capabilities to organize supplies, 
coordinate operations and collect intelligence. The link 
 back to the Allies was also highly regarded within the 
European Resistance and radio operators were thus 
highly prized.72 
Despite the importance of communications to 
SOE’s operational efficiency, SIS retained control 
over their wireless networks on the formation of the 
organization in 1940.73 The head of SIS, C, was also 
absolutely opposed to any other Secret W/T 
Service being set up in the U.K. I [C] fought long 
enough to try and maintain one Secret Service, 
and this would be another step in the wrong direc- 
tion, apart from the unlikelihood of S.O.2 being 
able to set up anything for many months which 
would give efficient results.74 
This adverse situation allowed SIS the ability to read 
and censor all traffic which originated from within 
SOE. There existed the general consensus within 
SOE that ‘C. telegrams take complete preference over 
[ours]’.75 As SOE’s messages were treated as a lower 
priority than those of SIS, there was an inevitable delay 
in the organization’s communications. This delay was 
anticipated to get worse as SOE grew.76 
As it became apparent that SIS’s control of their 
wireless communications was having a negative impact 
on the organization, SOE started arguing the case for 
running their own networks. It was not until 27 March 
1942 that the two organizations finally reached an 
agreement.77 By 22 May, SOE were in a position to 
begin transmitting.78 Official separation, however, did 
not occur until 1 June 1942.79 As has been discussed, 
it took SOE a number of months to construct their two 
independent Home Stations. Transferring operational 
control of the organization’s wireless networks was, 
therefore, not an instantaneous event. 
Despite their relatively late arrival in the field of 
wireless communications, the theoretical quality of 
SOE’s Home Stations quickly outstripped those of SIS. 
In comparison to SOE’s wireless facilities, those oper- 
ated by SIS were basic, cramped and did not contain 
standardized equipment. The lack of resources invested 
by SIS into wireless networks suggests that the organ- 
ization placed little emphasis on the need to commu- 
nicate with their representatives. For two branches of 
the British Secret Services who both needed to commu- 
nicate abroad,80 there existed a clear disparity between 
the wireless facilities of SOE and SIS. The quality of 
SOE’s communications was also recognized by their 
contemporaries. In preparation for Operation Overlord 
(the Battle of Normandy), the organization was allo- 
cated 200 frequencies for clandestine activities and  
a further 66 for joint military operations.81 Together, 
these represented 13% of all frequencies allotted for 
the invasion of Europe. Although this was less than 
those operated by the army and air force, SOE was 
provided more frequencies than the Royal Navy for 
Operation Overlord.82 
By dedicating a large proportion of the wireless 
networks for the invasion of Europe to SOE, the armed 
services were demonstrating their faith in the organiza- 
tion’s communications capabilities. In addition, SOE 
were also tasked by the War Office with supplying 
all Special Forces involved with the one-time pads 
they had developed.83 During the Second World War, 
SOE placed value on the development of their Home 
Stations. This was rewarded by their contemporaries 
within the armed services having faith in their ability 
to communicate with the field. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has, for the first time, presented an ini- 
tial assessment of the wireless facilities operated by 
SOE from the UK throughout the Second World War. 
Until 1942, it had been the responsibility of SIS to 
communicate on behalf of this ‘competing’ branch of 
the British Secret Services. Reluctantly handing over 
control in June, it took SOE a number of months to 
develop the capacity to take complete control of their 
networks. Until that point, a portion of their traffic was 
presumably still handled by SIS’s basic and cramped 
facilities. 
By the end of the war, SOE was operating a 
number of modern wireless facilities specifically con- 
structed to communicate with the European Resistance. 
The resources invested by the organization in devel- 
oping their Home Stations clearly illustrates that SOE 
valued reliable and efficient wireless networks. This 
allowed the organization to communicate directly with 
their agents and members of the resistance operating 
within occupied Europe throughout the Second World 
War. 
In contrast to SOE’s modern and resource-heavy 
Home Stations, SIS’s wireless facilities were under- 
resourced and of a basic nature. Until June 1942, it 
was the responsibility of these stations to communi- 
cate to occupied Europe on behalf of SOE. SIS was 
also responsible for providing SOE’s agents with the 
insecure ‘poem codes’.84 This article has demonstrated 
that the transfer of control of SOE’s wireless networks 
was not, however, prompt following the agreement 
reached between the organization and SIS in June 
1942. Based on this analysis, the role played by SOE 
in the Operation Nordpol disaster, therefore, could 
potentially be reassessed, a research opportunity for 
the future.85 
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NOTES 
 
1 Foot 1993, 18. 
2 Foot 1993, 14. 
3 Bailey 2008a, 186; 2008b, 57; Haestrup 1976, 189; 
Kedwood 1994, 182. 
4 Amongst the resistance networks, a high value was 
placed on their ability to communicate with the UK 
(Lorain 1983, 34). 
5 These wireless sets were generally designed by SOE’s 
Research and Development Section. Equipment was 
also developed on behalf of SOE by the Polish Military 
Wireless Research Unit (PMWR). 
6 ‘Home Stations’ was the name used by SOE to refer to 
a transmitter and receiving complex working together to 
communicate with their representatives abroad. 
7 See Gregory 2015. 
8 See Gregory 2013. The vast majority  of  studies  
into SOE have focused on the ‘glamorous’ exploits of 
the organization’s agents abroad. Research into SOE’s 
Country Sections is so firmly entrenched into the mentality 
of SOE scholars that there is a danger that topics which 
do not fit into operational boundaries will be overlooked 
(Murphy 2005, 205). 
9 Although other structures which formed SOE’s Home 
Stations also survive, permission could only be granted to 
access and survey the facility at Godington. 
10 West 1992, 1. 
11 SOE was formed by the combination of SIS’s Section 
D, the War Office’s MI(R) and Department EH. 
12 Stafford 1980, 38. 
13 Cocroft 2013, 66. 
14 Jeffrey 2010, 30. 
15 Richard Gambier-Parry was made a Brigadier in 1942. 
16 Jeffrey 2010, 10, 262, 318. 
17 TNA: HS 8/358 SO2 Communications through C, 9 
March 1941), 2. 
18 TNA: HS 8/358 To CD from E, 16 March 1941, 1. 
19 TNA: HS 8/358 S.O.2 Communications, 5 April 1941, 
1. 
20 TNA: HS 8/321 C/8686, 5 February 1942. 
21 TNA: HS 8/321 Communications, 26 March 1942. 
22 TNA: HS 8/360 Communications, 27 March 1942. 
23 Foot 1993, 157. 
24 The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the United 
States of America’s equivalent to SIS and SOE combined. 
This organization was to become the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA). 
25 Grendon Underwood had previously been STS53, and 
a school for training agents in the use of wireless 
communications. 
26 TNA: HS 7/34, Station Construction Section, 1. Con- 
temporary wireless technology required transmitters and 
receivers to be located in separate locations to enable them 
to operate efficiently. If they were badly positioned, the 
two facilities could interfere, causing unnecessary noise 
within the signal. 
27 TNA: HS 8/321 CD/OR/1565 17/04/1942, 1. 
28 TNA: HS 8/321 Gambier-Parry to Ozanne, 13 April 
1942, 1. 
29 TNA: HS 8/321 Gambier-Parry to Ozanne, 13 April 
1942, 1. The site had been vetted for interference by   
the General Post Office (GPO) (TNA: HS 8/321 CD/ 
OR/1565, 17 April 1942, 1–2). 
30 TNA: HS 8/321 CD/OR/1565, 17 April 1942, 1. 
31 TNA: HS 8/321 Gambier-Parry to Ozanne, 13 April 
1942, 1–2. 
32 TNA: HS 7/34 Station Construction Section, 1. 
33 Four of these operating positions were equipped for 
automatic sending. 
34 TNA: HS 7/34 Station Construction Section, 1. 
35 TNA: HS 7/34 Station Construction Section, 9. 
36 TNA: HS 8/37 Confidential Memorandum for Colonel 
Donovan, 14 December 1942, 1. 
37 TNA: HS 7/34 Station Construction Section, 10. 
38 Of all of SOE’s surviving wireless facilities, only 
access to Godington could be gained. This facility is on 
private land and is not accessible to the general public. 39 
See Eckersley & Ashbridge 1930, 195; Gregory & New- 
some 2010, 18; Weinberger 1924, 798. The incorporation 
of contemporary design standards was also observed in the 
construction of the new transmitter facility at Charndon. 
In late 1942, SOE decided to ‘form a mobile construction 
until (known as M.C.U.77) of R.E.s [Royal Engineers] 
under D/PROPS Section for the purpose of carrying out 
work of a particularly urgent or secret nature’ (TNA: HS 
7/15 Properties Section History, 6). 
40 Originally, Room 4 and Room 5 were a single space. At 
a later date, a partition was inserted by a farmer to make the 
structure more compatible to their agricultural requirements. 
41 IWM HU47925. 
42 TNA: HS 7/34 Station Construction Section, 10, 11. 
43 There is no structural evidence to indicate that there 
was an external door. The room which held the generator 
originally had a full-height double door. 
44 This arrangement is similar to ‘clean’ and ‘danger’ 
areas in explosive factories (see Cocroft 2000, 14). 
45 ‘For men may come and men may go’ is a quote from 
Tennyson’s poem The Brook. The full quotation is ‘I 
chatter, chatter, as I flow / To join the brimming river, / For 
men may come and men may go, / But I go on for ever’. 
46 Further pencil graffiti is located within the doorway 
between the office and the transmitter room of the 
Transmitter Building. This comprises two pencil sketches 
of people of unknown origin. 
47 There is no documentary evidence within SOE’s 
surviving archives, however, that there were two phases 
 of construction at the organization’s transmitter located 
at Godington. 
48 Despite the improvements made in SOE’s wireless 
communications following the construction of Godington, 
the organization was still limited by the available 
technology. Owing to the dangerous nature of radio 
operators transmitting from within occupied Europe, it 
was highly desirable that SOE’s agents could change 
frequency with great speed. This limited the ability of 
the German interceptors to transcribe the messages as 
well as pinpointing the location of the transmission. At 
the time, it took the 250w transmitters, on average, four 
to five minutes to accomplish this accurately. In order to 
overcome this issue, SOE began researching a solution. 
Eventually the organization developed a Wide Band 
Transmitting Amplifier working with a three-wire rhombic 
antennae. This was to provide SOE with a good signal 
over a wide area combined with the ability to transmit 
on 12 channels simultaneously. Of greater value to the 
organization was the ability to allow the average operator 
to change frequency in as little as 30 seconds (TNA: HS 
7/34 Station Construction Section, 10, 11). 
49 Structural evidence indicates that the complex was 
erected in two distinct phases. It is the second phase of 
construction upon which the new complex at Charndon 
was based. 
50 TNA: HS 7/34 Station Construction Section, 11, 12. 
51 These 35 dipoles and two rhombic antennae were 
constructed out of 16,000ft (4,876.8m) of wire and five 
120ft (36.58m), 12 100ft (30.48m), four 80ft (24.38m) 
and two 60ft (18.29m) masts. 
52 TNA: HS 7/34 Station Construction Section, 11, 12. 
53 TNA: HS 7/15 Properties Section History, 6. 
54 Eckersley & Ashbridge 1930, 195. 
55 Eckersley & Ashbridge 1930, 195. 
56 Gregory & Newsome 2010, 18. 
57 Weinberger 1924, 798. 
58 This design standard was also observed in the 
construction of the new transmitter facility at Charndon. 
As this new station was based on the design of Godington, 
the generator was again installed in a separate building. 
59 Thomas & Williamson 1941, 539. 
60 Eckersley & Ashbridge 1930, 204. 
61 TNA: HS 7/15 Properties Section History, 6. 
62 Jeffrey 2010, 262, 318. Section VIII had only been 
established 17 months before war was declared. This 
section, therefore, had limited experience at the start of 
the conflict. 
63 Bletchley Park is more famously known as Station  
X, home to the Government Code and Cypher School 
(GCCS). 
64 Pidgeon 2008, 27. 
65 Pidgeon 2008, 80, 81, 82–3, 114, 262. 
66 Pidgeon 2008, 80, 81, 82–3, 114, 262. 
67 Pidgeon 2008, 82, 287. 
68 IWM HU47925. 
69 Pidgeon 2008, 114, 285–6, 295. The US Civilian 
Technical Corps was a quasi-military organization 
established in 1941 to assist the UK in the war effort 
within the UK. 
70 Pidgeon 2008, 295. 
71 Pidgeon 2008, 295. 
72 Lorain 1983, 34. 
73 Read & Fisher 1984, 270. 
74 TNA: HS 8/358 C/6050, 21 March 1941, 2. On the 
formation of SOE, the organization was arranged into 
three branches: SO1 responsible for propaganda, SO2 for 
active operations and SO3 for planning and administration 
(Foot 1993, 23). 
75 TNA: HS 8/358 SO2 Communications through C, 9 
March 1941, 1. 
76 TNA: HS 8/358 SO2 Communications, 5 April 1941, 1. 
77 TNA: HS 8/321 Communications, 27 March 1942. 
78 TNA: HS 8/360 ADP/TC/1195, 22 May 1942. 
79 Foot 1993, 157. 
80 For SOE, wireless communications enabled the 
organization to coordinate and communicate with 
members of the European Resistance. For SIS, radio 
contact provided the organization with a means to collect 
intelligence their agents had collected. 
81 Pidgeon 2008, 2. 
82 TNA: HS 7/34 Signal Planning Section, 2. 
83 Marks 1998, 459. The coding system used by SIS, 
and imposed on SOE, was the ‘Poem’ code. This was an 
insecure system which could be easily broken. It required 
an agent to memorize a poem and then rearrange the words 
and then number the letters. The numbers were then used 
as a key to the cipher. 
84 Marks 1998, 434. 
85 Operation NORDPOL was also known as the 
Englandspiel. 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Bailey, R. 2008a, Forgotten Voices of the Secret War:  
an Inside History of Special Operations during the 
Second World War, London: Ebury Press. 
Bailey, R. 2008b, The Wildest Province: SOE in the Land 
of the Eagle, London: Jonathan Cape. 
Cocroft, W. 2000, Dangerous Energy: the Archaeology of 
Gunpowder and Military Explosives Manufacture, 
Swindon: English Heritage. 
Cocroft, W. 2013, ‘The archaeology of military 
communications’, Ind. Archaeol. Rev. 35:1, 65–79. 
Eckersley, P. & Ashbridge, N. 1930, ‘A wireless 
broadcasting transmitting station for dual programme 
service’, J. Inst. Electr. Eng. 68:405, 1149–70. 
Foot, M. 1993, SOE: The Special Operations Executive 
1940–46, London: Arrow Books. 
Foot, M. 2005, ‘Research note: the Dutch Affair’, Intell. 
Nat. Secur. 20:2, 341–3. 
 Foot, M. 2006, SOE in France: an Account of the Work of 
the British Special Operations Executive in France, 
1940–1944, London: Frank Cass. 
Giske, H. 1953, London Calling North Pole, London: 
William Kimber. 
Gregory, D. 2013, ‘SOE’s Station 53B Transmitter 
Complex, Godington, Oxfordshire: an Architectural 
Survey of the Special Operations Executive’s 
Transmitter Complex at Godington’, unpubl. rep. 
Gregory, D. 2015, ‘Built to Resist: an Assessment of the 
Special Operations Executive’s Infrastructure in the 
United Kingdom during the Second World War’, 
University of East Anglia PhD thesis. 
Gregory, D. & Newsome, S. 2010, Cooling Radio Station: 
an Archaeological Investigation of a Short-Wave 
Receiving Station, Swindon: English Heritage. 
Haestrup, J. 1976, Secret Alliance: A Study of the Danish 
Resistance movement 1940–45 Vol. 1, Odense: 
Odense University Press. 
Jeffrey, K. 2010, MI6: the History of the Secret Intelligence 
Service 1909–1949, London: Bloomsbury. 
Kedwood, H. 1994, In Search of the Maquis: Rural 
Resistance in Southern France 1942–1944, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Lorain, P. 1983, Secret Warfare: the Arms and Techniques 
of the Resistance, London: Orbis Publishing. 
Marks, L. 1998, Between Silk and Cyanide: the Story of 
SOE’s Code War, London: Harper Collins Publishers. 
Murphy, C. 2005, ‘SOE’s foreign currency transactions’, 
Intell. Nat. Secur. 20:1, 191–208. 
Perquin, J.-L. 2011,  The  Clandestine  Radio 
Operators: SOE, BCRA, OSS, Paris: Histoire and 
Collections. 
Pidgeon, G. 2008, The Secret Wireless War: The Story  
of MI6 Communications 1939–1945, Richmond: 
Arundel Books. 
Read, A. & Fisher, D. 1984, Colonel Z: the Secret Life of 
a Master of Spies, London: Hodder and Stoughton. 
Seaman, M. 2005, ‘A glass half full — some thoughts on 
the evolution of the study of the Special Operations 
Executive’, Intell. Nat. Secur. 20:1, 27–43. 
Stafford, D. 1980, Britain and European Resistance 1940– 
1945: a Survey of the Special Operations Executive 
with Documents, London: Macmillan. 
Thomas, H. & Williamson, R. 1941, ‘A commercial 50-
kilowatt frequency-modulation broadcast 
transmitting station’, Proc. IRE 29:10, 537–45. 
Van der Mandele, H. 2012, ‘The Dutch Affair revisited 
or the destructive power of organizational warfare’, 
Intell. Nat. Secur. 28:6, 910–12. 
Weinberger, J. 1924, ‘Broadcast transmitting stations of 
the Radio Corporation of America’, Proc. IRE 12:6, 
745–803. 
West, N. 1992, Secret War: the Story of SOE Britain’s 
Wartime Sabotage Organisation, London: Hodder 
and Stoughton. 
Wolters, J. 2006, ‘Remarks concerning a research note on 
The Dutch Affair’, Intell. Nat. Secur. 21:3, 459–66. 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
C Head of SIS 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
GPO General Post Office 
IWM Imperial War Museum 
NMR National Monument Record 
OSS Office of Strategic Services 
PMWR Polish Military Wireless Research 
SOE Special Operations Executive 
SIS Secret Intelligence Service 
STS Special Training Schools 
TNA The National Archives 
W/T Wireless Telegraphy 
 
 
SUMMARY IN FRENCH, GERMAN, ITALIAN AND SPANISH 
 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
Communiquer avec la Résistance Européenne : une 
estimation de l’équipement sans fil des Opérations 
Spéciales Exécutives au Royaume-Uni durant la 
Seconde Guerre Mondiale 
Pour la première fois, une étude sur l’équipement de 
communication basé au Royaume-Uni des Opérations 
Spéciales Exécutives (SOE) est présentée. Etablie en 
1940, la SOE était responsable de la coordination de 
tous les actes de sabotage contre l’ennemi d’outre- 
mer, actes rendus possible avec l’aide d’une liaison 
de communication fiable avec la résistance. A partir 
de l’examen des stations de la SOE du pays, cet article 
démontre la valeur que l’organisation a placée dans la 
fiabilité des communications sans fil. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Verbindung mit dem europäischen Widerstand: 
eine Untersuchung der Radio-Möglichkeiten der 
Speziellen Operations-Exekutive im UK während 
des zweiten Weltkriegs 
Dieser Artikel zeigt zum ersten Mal eine Untersuchung 
der Speziellen Arbeitsweise der Exekutive (SOE), der 
UK-basierenden      Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten. 
 Etabliert  in  1940,  war  SOE  verantwortlich   für 
die Koordination aller Interventionen gegen die 
Sabotageakte des Feindes jenseits des Meeres. Dies 
war nur möglich mit der verläßlichen Hilfe eines 
Verbindungsringes mit dem Widerstand. Durch das 
Studium der heimischen SOE-Stationen will dieser 
Artikel den Wert der Organisation zeigen, die auf 
verläßlich drahtloser Kommunikation basierte. 
 
RIASSUNTO 
Comunicare con la Resistenza in Europa: una 
valutazione delle comunicazioni mob della ‘Special 
Operations Executive’ (SOE) nel Regno Unito 
durante la seconda Guerra mondiale 
Questo articolo presenta per la prima volta un’analisi 
delle comunicazioni mobili della Special Operations 
Executive (SOE) operative nel Regno Unito. Fondata 
nel 1940, la SOE fu responsabile del coordinamento 
di tutti gli atti di sabotaggio ai danni del nemico 
oltremanica. Ciò fu possibile solo grazie all’apporto 
di  un  affidabile  sistema  di  comunicazioni  con  la 
resistenza. Attraverso l’analisi delle Home Stations 
(postazioni in patria) della SOE, questo articolo vuole 
dimostrare l’importanza che fu attribuita a postazioni 
radio affidabili. 
 
RESUMEN 
Hablando con la resistencia europea: una evaluación 
de las instalaciones inalámbricas del Special 
Operations Executive del Reino Unido durante la 
Segunda Guerra Mundial 
En este artículo se estudia por primera vez los 
servicios de comunicación del Special Operations 
Executive (SOE) del Reino Unido. Fundado en 1940, 
SOE fue responsable de coordinar todos los actos   
de sabotaje contra el enemigo en el extranjero. Esto 
sólo fue posible mediante el establecimiento de una 
red de comunicaciones fiables con la resistencia. 
Estudiando los campamentos bases del SOE, este 
artículo demuestra el valor que dicha organización 
colocó en las comunicaciones inalámbricas. 
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